Is knowledge definable as justified true belief ("JTB")? We argue that one can legitimately answer positively or negatively, depending on how the notion of justification is understood. To facilitate our argument, we introduce a simple propositional logic of reason-based belief. We show that this logic is sufficiently flexible to accommodate various useful features, including quantification over reasons. We use our framework to contrast two notions of JTB: one internalist, the other externalist. We argue that Gettier cases essentially challenge the internalist notion but not the externalist one. In particular, we may equate knowledge and JTB if the latter is grounded in what we call "adequate" reasons.
Introduction
Can the ordinary concept of knowledge be defined in terms of justified true belief ("JTB")? Since Gettier's paper [10] , the answer to this question is widely considered negative. Gettier produced two cases intended to show that a belief can be true, justified, and yet fall short of knowledge. The first concerns Smith, an applicant for a job who has "strong evidence" that Jones is the man who will get the job and also that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Unknown to Smith, it turns out that Smith himself has ten coins in pocket and is actually the one selected for the job. Smith's belief that "the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" is therefore true and justified, but it seems inappropriate to say that this belief constitutes knowledge. The second case is one in which Smith believes a false proposition p based on persuasive evidence for p and infers from p some true proposition p ∨ q by picking the true disjunct q at random. Here too, Smith justifiably believes p ∨ q, but it seems incorrect to say that he knows p ∨ q.
Our point of departure in this paper is the following: even though we agree with the force of Gettier's examples, we think the notion of justification remains insufficiently analyzed, both in Gettier's original paper and in most discussions that have followed. 1 What Gettier's examples show * Funded by Programs ANR-10-LABX-0087 IEC, ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 PSL* and by the ANR project "Trivalence and Natural Language Meaning."
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1 A notable exception is the analysis in the Justification Logic literature: [2, 3] uses a formal framework to track what goes wrong with specific lines of reasoning in the examples of Gettier, Goldman, and Kripke; and [4, 5] uses a related framework that has additional features from Belief Revision Theory to reason about the examples of Lehrer and Gettier. Our work here is different. First, while inspired by the Justification Logic approach to reasoning about justifications, our setting is in many respects simplified but at the same time includes certain novel features (see §2.4 for details). Second, our task here is different than that in [2, 3] : beyond providing a formal diagnosis of what goes wrong in certain Gettier-type examples, we define different kinds of JTB and discuss their relative susceptibility to is that an agent can have a plausible internal justification for believing a proposition without that justification being properly adequate to the truth of the proposition in question. But if so, Gettier cases must only show that knowledge is not identical with JTB under an internalist conception of justification. The examples do not thereby rule out the existence of a more externalist notion of justification capable of sustaining the equation between knowledge and JTB. Define knowledge as true belief with adequate justification, and it appears Gettier cases no longer have a bite.
Admittedly, this definition might not provide a noncircular or reductive analysis (see [17] ): the notion of "adequacy" may ultimately have to be understood in ways that presuppose a prior grasp of the concept of knowledge. For example, if an adequate justification were to mean "a justification that is suitable to make the belief count as knowledge," then it would appear that we define knowledge in terms of itself. We agree with this objection, but the notion of adequacy may also turn out to not depend on epistemic notions. Adequacy, for instance, may turn out to be definable in terms of truth-making, and the truth-making relation need not refer to prior epistemic notions. Or consider the relation between a fully formalized axiomatic proof and a mathematical statement derived in that proof: the "adequacy" of the proof as a vehicle for mathematical truth is a purely syntactic notion, with no epistemological concepts presupposed. These examples suggest to us that room remains for a fruitful investigation of the concepts of knowledge, belief, and justification that acknowledges the distinction between adequate and inadequate reasons.
In this paper, our main goal is to clarify this duality in the concept of justification and show precisely what role it plays in Gettier-type examples. The gist of our account, therefore, lies in the distinction between reasons that (merely) support belief in a proposition and reasons that are not only supportive but are also what we call adequate. In order to articulate this distinction, we present the Logic of Reason-Based Belief in §2. This logic provides an explicit representation of reasons to believe a proposition. We show that the logic is sufficiently flexible to accommodate quantifiers over reasons, limited or full closure of reason-based belief under implication, and an optional requirement that all beliefs be reason-based. In §3, we put this logic to work in the analysis of Gettier cases: first to tease apart two notions of justification, one internalist and the other externalist; and second to study the susceptibility of internal JTB and of external JTB to Gettier-type examples. We close the paper with a puzzle about whether knowledge ought to hold in cases in which an agent possesses several reasons for a proposition, some adequate and others inadequate. Technical notions and results that are not required for an understanding of the main text are relegated to an appendix. analysis in this paper. Instead, we merely have a primitive to express that "reason r is adequate," though we require that adequacy of r implies "veridicality" of r (i.e., that r only supports true things). In so doing, we commit ourselves to the idea that adequacy forces truth (see [1] ). However, reasons can be veridical without being adequate, a fact that will be essential to our account of Gettier cases.
Reason-Based Belief
Fix nonempty sets P of propositional letters and R of reason symbols (also called "reasons"). 2 F is the set of formulas ϕ defined by the following grammar:
Other Boolean connectives are defined as abbreviations.
• r : ϕ says, "r is a reason to believe ϕ."
Sometimes it will be convenient to read r : ϕ as "r supports ϕ." The two readings of r : ϕ will be used interchangeably, so that "support" of a formula has an implicit direct connection with having a reason to believe the formula.
• r says, "r is an adequate reason." Our logic will guarantee that every proposition supported by an adequate reason is true (i.e., we will have r : ϕ → (r → ϕ) for all formulas ϕ).
• Bϕ says, "the agent believes ϕ."
The formula Br is therefore read, "the agent believes r is an adequate reason." Sometimes it will be convenient to say that "the agent accepts reason r" to mean that Br holds. So believing reason r is adequate and accepting reason r will be considered to mean the same thing.
To reduce the number of parentheses while ensuring unique readability of formulas, we adopt the convention that the colon operator binds more strongly than any Boolean connective. For example, r : ϕ → ψ denotes (r : ϕ) → ψ and not r : (ϕ → ψ) .
The theory RBB of Reason-Based Belief appears in Table 1 . We write ⊢ ϕ to mean that ϕ is deriavable in RBB. The negation is written ϕ.
Regarding the axioms and rules of RBB from Table 1 , (CL) and (MP) say that RBB is an extension of classical propositional logic. (RK) says that reasons are closed under material implication, and (RN) says that reasons support all derivable formulas. (A) says that if r is a reason to believe ϕ and r is an adequate reason, then ϕ is true. (RB) says that if r is a reason to believe ϕ and the agent believes that r is an adequate reason, then the agent believes ϕ. (D) says that the agent's beliefs are consistent: she cannot have contradictory beliefs (i.e., believe both ϕ and ¬ϕ for Axiom Schemes Table 1 . The theory RBB some ϕ). Finally, (E) says that the agent's beliefs do not distinguish between provably equivalent formulas.
As for mnemonics, (CL) is "Classical Logic," (MP) is "Modus Ponens," (RK) is Kripke's axiom K of modal logic (used here for reasons), (RN) is "Reason Necessitation," (A) is "Adequacy," (RB) is "Reasons to Beliefs," (D) is a well-known axiom from modal logic [7] , and (E) is a well-known rule from minimal modal logic [7] .
Some useful terminology: given a reason r and a formula ψ to be used as an assumption describing the key features of a particular situation of reason-based belief, to say
• "r is adequate (assuming ψ)" means ⊢ ψ → r;
• "r is veridical for ϕ (assuming ψ)" means ⊢ ψ → (r : ϕ → ϕ); and
• "r is veridical (assuming ψ)" means ⊢ ψ → (r : ϕ → ϕ) for each formula ϕ.
Within the confines of a given discussion in which the above terminology is used, the assumption ψ will generally be clear from context or else immaterial (i.e., one may take an arbitrary ψ). Therefore, the parenthetical expressions in the above terminology are generally omitted when the terminology is actually used. Note that ψ may also be the trivial assumption ⊤ (i.e., a fixed propositional tautology such as p ∨ ¬p for some fixed p ∈ P ). One clarification before we proceed: it follows by (A) that every adequate reason is veridical; however, a veridical reason is not necessarily adequate (i.e., the set {¬r} ∪ {r : ϕ → ϕ | ϕ ∈ F } is consistent with RBB).
A semantics for RBB is presented in §A.1. It is shown in Theorem A.1 that RBB is sound and complete for this semantics.
Weak Belief But Strong Reasons
RBB posits an extremely weak notion of belief. In particular, beliefs are not necessarily closed under material implication. That is, it is consistent to have
which says that the agent believes an implication and the antecedent of the implication but not the consequent. Further, there is no principle of RBB that guarantees us a minimum collection of beliefs that the agent will hold. Indeed, we might think of (RB) as the main route for determining what it is that the agent believes, but even this principle requires an additional assumption that the reason in question is believed to be adequate. So, like all other axioms and rules that have something to say about belief, (RB) tells us that a belief obtains only if we already assume some other belief is already present. As a result, our theory allows for the possibility that the agent has no beliefs whatsoever : the set {¬Bϕ | ϕ ∈ F } that collects together all statements of non-belief is consistent with our theory. So RBB does not require that the agent have any beliefs. But whenever she does, they are consistent by (D), they do not distinguish between provable equivalence by (E), and they encompass all supported assertions of a believed reason by (RB). But no further restrictions are placed on the notion of belief. Belief is therefore governed by the minimal modal logic ED [7] . Reasons, on the other hand, are fairly strong. First, they encompass all derivable statements by (RN). Second, they are closed under implication (and hence under (MP)) by (RK). Third, if adequate, then (A) says that they are veridical: everything they support is true. Reasons therefore support many assertions (infinitely many, in fact, because each reason supports each of the infinitely many theorems of RBB by (RN)). This puts more requirements on reasons (i.e., they must do more things), which makes them stronger. Reasons are governed by what is essentially the normal multi-modal logic KT (with one modal operator " r : " for each reason r), except that the T axiom r : ϕ → ϕ (sometimes called "veridicality") is not guaranteed to hold unless, according to (A), we make the additional assumption that r is adequate. This way of having a multi-modal logic like KT but with the "modal operator" r itself a formula (whose truth implies veridicality) is, to our knowledge, new. 3 We have chosen a theory of weak belief but stong reasons in order to keep things as simple as possible but still address some of the major trends in the epistemological study of knowledge as justified true belief ("JTB"). In all of the examples from epistemology we consider in this paper, we need some way to track an agent's logical inferences and some way to link these inferences to what the agent believes. Our theory RBB is a simple and minimalistic way of doing just this: reasons are used to handle the relevant inferencing, the agent can "accept" a reason (or not) by believing it to be adequate (or not), the agent comes to believe things supported by reasons she accepts, and the agent's beliefs are always consistent. This way we can encode inferencing using a reason, indicate whether the agent accepts this inferencing, and thereby infer whether she believes some statement based on a reason. We also allow the possiblity that she believes something without a reason, by which we mean that the set {Bϕ} ∪ {r : ϕ → ¬Br | r ∈ R} is consistent with our theory. Accordingly, we can separate out reason-based beliefs from those not coming from any reason, and we can use the inferencing apparatus of reasons to characterize 3 The usual way of writing our formula r : ϕ would be ✷rϕ. So RBB is just a multi-modal logic with an extra formula r for each r ∈ R, a K-modality " r : " (our variant of ✷r) for each r ∈ R that respects the reflexivity scheme T if r holds (as per (A)), and an ED-modality B that is linked to the other modalities via scheme (RB). According to our intended semantics ( §A.1), we interpret modal operators using a possible worlds semantics (with a neighborhood function for B), and the intended interpretation of the formula r is that the binary accessibility relation corresponding to the modal operator " r : " is reflexive. Certain hybrid logics [6] can express reflexivity of modal operators: the formula ↓x.¬✷r¬x says that the accessibility relation corresponding to ✷r is reflexive. However, hybrid logics generally include additional features permitting greater expressivity than we need.
the key features of a number of important epistemological examples. And all of this is done in a simple, minimalistic setting.
Consistency of Reasons
One interesting theorem of RBB is the principle
of reason consistency. This principle says that if an agent believes reasons r and s are adequate, then r and s cannot support contradictory assertions. Intuitively, the derivability of (RC) follows because (RB) requires that an agent who believes a reason also believes everything that the reason supports and (D) requires that an agent not have contradictory beliefs. Notice that if we take r = s in (RC), then we obtain a statement provably equivalent to
which says that a reason believed to be adequate is internally consistent. If the agent does not believe r is a adequate reason, then r can be internally inconsistent (i.e., we can have that r is a reason to believe both ϕ and ¬ϕ for some formula ϕ). Put another way, the formula ¬Br ∧ r : ϕ ∧ r : ¬ϕ is consistent with our theory. Similarly, if the agent believes r is an adequate reason but does not believe s is an adequate reason, then our theory does not rule out the possibility that r and s are inconsistent. That is, Br ∧ ¬Bs ∧ r : ϕ ∧ s : ¬ϕ is also consistent with our theory. Finally, since the theory RBB is consistent (and hence does not prove both ϕ and ¬ϕ for some formula ϕ), 4 any adequate reason is internally consistent. That is,
which says that a reason r that supports ϕ and is adequate cannot also support ¬ϕ. It follows from (AIC) that any internally inconsistent reason is not adequate.
Logical Closure and Combination of Reasons
If ψ is a logical consequence of ϕ, meaning ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then our theory says that r is a reason to believe the consequent ψ whenever r is a reason to believe the antecedent ϕ. That is,
The proof: from ϕ → ψ, we obtain r : (ϕ → ψ) by (RN). This is the antecedent of an instance of (RK), so the consequent r : ϕ → r : ψ of this instance is derivable by an application of (MP). This completes the proof. In examining this proof, we see that (RCLC) is a consequence of the stronger logical principle encompassed by our axiom
which says that reasons are closed under material implication. The principle (RCLC) says that reasons are closed under logical consequence. It is unclear whether this is a desirable principle. For example, it may make more sense to say that if ψ is a logical consequence of ϕ and r is a reason to believe ϕ, then it is not r itself that is a reason to believe the consequence ψ. Instead, what is wanted is some more complicated reason r ′ that not only references r but also provides some reason s as to why ψ obtains from ϕ. That is, we might seek a principle like this:
This is the principle of Application from Justification Logic [3] . It says: if s is a reason to believe the implication ϕ → ψ and r is a reason to believe the antecedent ϕ, then a new object s·r obtained by combining s and r is a reason to believe the consequent ψ. In essence, the more complex reason s · r keeps track of everything we would need to check to see that ψ indeed obtains: the initial reason r for the antecedent ϕ and a reason s for the implication ϕ → ψ. Further, the syntactic structure of s · r, with s to the left and r to the right, tells us what kind of a reason we have: based on the form of (App), it is suggested that s is some implication, r is the antecedent of that implication, and s · r is a reason for the consequent. In essence, we are describing specific witnesses for an instance of the rule (MP) of Modus Ponens:
(App) is a more nuanced version of (RK): if we have r : (ϕ → ψ) and r : ϕ, then we do not obtain r : ψ straightaway using (App). Instead, we must construct the reason r · r in support of ψ. The single instance of " · " in the syntactic structure of the latter reason reflects our use of one derivational step (i.e., one instance of (MP)) to obtain ψ.
To do away with (RCLC), we must do away with (K) and modify (RN). In particular, let R 0 be a nonempty set of "basic" reasons, define R to be the smallest extension of R 0 satisfying the property that s, t ∈ R implies s · t ∈ R, replace scheme (K) by scheme (App), and restrict (RN) by requiring that r ∈ R 0 . (It is assumed that all other schemes and rules can use reasons coming from the full set R.) Call the resulting theory RBB+(App). In RBB+(App), it is consistent to have
which says that r is not closed under implication. As a result, it can be shown that (RCLC) no longer obtains. But note that (RK) and (RCLC) do not fail in RBB+(App) because logical or materially implied consequences of assertions are no longer "accessible" by some reason. Indeed, in the situation (1) under the theory RBB+(App), the logical consequence ψ of ϕ is still "accessible" by the reason r · r. However, this reason r · r is more "complex" than the original reason r (in terms of the number of instances of the (MP)-encoding Application operator " · " that appear inside it). In general, distant consequences that would require many repetitions of (App) are still accessible; it is just that the reasons that access these consequences may be very "complex."
Justification Logic (JL) [3] is the study of logics of reason-based belief (with reasons thought of as "justifications"). Defining JL 0 to be the fragment of RBB+(App) obtained by omitting all belief formulas and belief axioms from the theory, Justification Logics may be thought of as extensions of JL 0 . 5 Many JLs permit other kinds of combinations of reasons than what we saw with (App). Our logic RBB is closely related to the JL tradition, though we conspicuously omit (App), retain (K) (and thereby endorse (RCLC)), leave (RN) without the additional restriction, and maintain a set R of primitive reasons that cannot be combined to form more complex reasons. In so doing, we lose the ability to have the syntactic structure of reasons reflect the structure of derivations in the theory, and thereby forgo a more nuanced tracking of the interaction between logical consequence and the complexity of reasons. We accept these consequences in the interest of developing a system that is simple and yet still of use to the formal epistemologist. Nevertheless, we recognize that a reader may be interested to see a thorough study of more sophisticated extensions of our theory that allow for the combination of reasons along the lines of (App) (and perhaps for other features as well). We advise such a reader to consult the JL literature directly [3] .
Since our theory does not allow the agent to combine reasons in the sense of (App) and beliefs are not closed under implication, it is consistent for us to have a situation wherein the agent has the requisite information to draw a belief but simply does not draw it. For example, assuming s = r, it is consistent to have
which says that the agent believes the reason s supporting an implication is adequate (and hence the agent believes the implication), the agent believes the reason r supporting the antecedent is adequate (and hence the agent believes the antecedent), and yet the agent does not believe the consequent (even though she believes the implication and its antecedent). The problem is that her beliefs are not closed under (MP). This is so despite the fact that, by (RCLC) and (RB), beliefs coming from the same reason are closed under (MP):
So long as the implication and its antecedent come from separate beliefs as in (2), the agent need not believe the consequent. The consistency of (2) is a consequence of our design: we use reason operators to encode inferencing, and we use belief operators to encode the particular inferencing and the individual assertions that the agent accepts (in terms of her affirmed beliefs). As such, the situation (2) is one in which the agent has not yet performed sufficient inferencing to accept the conclusion ψ, even though she is very close (after all, she has done enough to accept the implication ϕ → ψ and its antecedent ϕ). In essence, this lack of closure allows us to place one kind of constraint on the agent's inferencing powers. If desired, one can place even more severe constraints as in [5] ; however, this seems to require more syntax and additional axioms. One can also go the other way and lift these constraints entirely; in §2.5 we will suggest one natural way to do this in our setting. But for now we retain what we hope is a "happy medium" in the form our theory RBB.
Implication-closed and Purely Reason-Based Beliefs
We saw in (2) that reason-based beliefs in RBB need not be closed under implication if the source reasons are different. If we would like to ensure that reason-based beliefs are always closed under implication, even if the beliefs come from separate reasons, then a simple solution is to introduce a "master reason" σ that encodes the combined information of all reasons the agent accepts. This requires us to expand our reason set R to include a new symbol σ not already present and then add the following additional schemes to RBB:
(MA) says that every accepted reason is adequate if the master reason is adequate, (MB) says that the agent always believes the master reason, and (MR) says that anything supported by a reason that the agent believes is also supported by the master reason. Adding these principles makes it so that σ is the sum of the agent's evidence. Calling RBB σ the theory obtained from RBB by expanding the set R of reasons to include a new symbol σ and adding (MA), (MB), and (MR), it follows that
Indeed, if the agent believes the reason s supporting an implication is adequate and the agent believes the reason r supporting the antecedent is adequate, then it follows by (MR) that σ supports the implication and its antecedent. Therefore, by (RK) and (MP), σ supports the consequent. But the agent believes σ to be adequate by (MB), and therefore it follows by (RB) that the agent believes the consequent. It is in this sense that the agent "combines" the information conveyed by reasons she believes to be adequate into the master reason σ.
While we have shown that the RBB σ -agent may combine the information from two reasons to derive her beliefs, there is no need to restrict the number of reasons to two. Indeed, according to (MB), the agent implicitly combines into σ the information from every reason she believes to be adequate, no matter how many of these there may be.
In RBB σ , the master reason σ serves as a witness for an existential quantifier over reasons that the agent accepts (i.e., believes to be adequate). 6 In particular, (MR) tells us that if there exists an accepted reason r that supports ϕ, then σ supports ϕ. Hence by (MB), if there exists such an r, then σ supports ϕ and is itself accepted. If we were to add quantifiers to the language (something we do later in §2.6), we could express this as:
That is, if there exists an accepted reason that supports ϕ, then σ is a witness to the existential quantifier.
Both RBB σ and the basic theory RBB allow for the possibility that the agent believes a formula ϕ without any supporting reasons (i.e., she does not believe to be adequate any reason that supports ϕ). This is the same as saying that the set {Bϕ} ∪ {r : ϕ → ¬Br | r ∈ R} is consistent with both RBB σ and RBB. If this situation is undesirable, then a simple remedy is to extend the theory RBB σ by adding a principle that says all beliefs are supported by the master reason:
With (MT) in place, the agent believes only those things supported by σ and hence, by (MR), she believes only those things supported by some reason. In short, every belief is "reason-based." Defining RBB + σ to be the theory obtained from RBB σ by adding (MT), it follows by (MT), (RB), and (MB) that RBB + σ ⊢ Bϕ ↔ σ : ϕ , which says that the agent believes something just in case it is supported by the master reason. But then belief can be conflated with the master reason. As a result, we have by (RCLC) that the beliefs of the RBB 
Quantification Over Reasons
We have observed that the theory RBB does not require that every belief arise from a reason: it is consistent with RBB for the agent to believe ϕ and yet have no reason r supporting ϕ that she believes to be adequate. If we were to introduce quantifiers over reasons into our language, then we could express this situation by saying that the following formula is consistent:
Another example: we might like to say that r is the unique reason supporting ϕ that the agent believes to be adequate:
To allow such expressions as formulas, we extend our set of formulas F to the larger set F ∀ consisting of all formulas ϕ that may be formed by the following grammar:
We adopt usual Boolean connective abbreviations along with the following:
Note that in this language, an element r ∈ R can act both as a reason (as in the formula r : p) and as a quantifier variable (as in the formula (∀r)(r : p)). Therefore, reasons may appear either bound or free in formulas, with the notion of bound and free defined in the usual way. For reasons s and r and a formula ϕ, we say that s is free for r in ϕ to mean that r has no free occurrence in ϕ within the scope of a quantifier (∀s). Put another way, if s is free for r in ϕ, then in the formula
obtained by substituting all free occurrences of r in ϕ by s, no newly replaced occurrence is bound. Examples: s is free for r in (∀t)(t = r) but not in (∀s)(s = r).
The theory QRBB of Quantified Reason-Based Belief is defined in Table 2 . (UD), (UI), and (Gen) are standard principles of first-order quantification. (EP) and (EN) say that two reasons are considered to be the same if and only if they are syntactically identical.
Axiom Schemes
, where s is free for r in ϕ (EP) r = r (EN) ¬(r = s), where r and s are syntactically different It is shown in Corollary A.11 that for each ϕ ∈ F not containing quantifiers, we have QRBB ⊢ ϕ if and only if RBB ⊢ ϕ. It is therefore unproblematic for us to simply write ⊢ ϕ to say that ϕ is provable.
We can extend QRBB to the theory QRBB σ obtained by extending R to include a new master reason σ and adding the schemes (MA), (MB), and (MR) for σ. We can further extend QRBB σ to the theory QRBB + σ obtained by adding the additional scheme (MT) to guarantee all beliefs are reason-based.
Semantics for QRBB, for QRBB σ , and for QRBB + σ may be found in §A.3. It is shown in Theorems A.5 and A.12 that each of QRBB, QRBB σ , and QRBB + σ is sound and complete for its semantics. However, for the completeness result, there is one caveat: our proof requires that the set R of reasons be at least countably infinite.
Justified True Belief and Knowledge
We use our logical framework to tease apart two notions of justified true belief (henceforth "JTB"). The first is an internalist notion, which Gettier showed was insufficient for knowledge. The second is an externalist notion that we argue is immune to Gettier scenarios. After defining these two notions of JTB, we indicate their relationship and discuss whether external JTB might be a viable candidate for knowledge.
Two Notions of Justification
In our theory, there are (at least) two natural ways to define JTB:
• JTB e r (ϕ) := r : ϕ ∧ Br ∧ r, and
Both imply that the agent has a true belief that ϕ. However, JTB e r (ϕ) suggests that the agent has a true belief justified by an adequate reason, whereas JTB i r (ϕ) suggests that the agent only has a true belief justified by a prima facie reason (that may not be adequate). JTB e r is thus externalist, while JTB i r is internalist. Gettier's achievement was to deny that JTB i r (ϕ) is the same as knowledge of ϕ. For example, if we assume that
then we have Gettier's second case. 7 In particular, since r is a reason to believe p, we have by (RCLC) that r is a reason to believe p ∨ q. Since the agent believes r is an adequate reason, she will believe both p and p ∨ q. But p is false and q is true. So, assuming she has no reason supporting q that she believes is adequate, we are in a situation where she has a JTB of p ∨ q based solely on a reason supporting the false disjunct p. As a result, Gettier and many others argue that the agent does not know p ∨ q, even though she does have a JTB that p ∨ q (in the internal sense of JTB i r (p ∨ q)).
In contrast, if we assume that JTB e r (p), which is
then, since r supports p, it also supports p ∨ q by (RCLC). But r is an adequate reason and therefore both p and p ∨ q are true. Since the agent believes r is an adequate reason, she believes both p and p ∨ q, and in this case her belief is based on an adequate (and hence veridical) reason. In general, it is easy to see that JTB e r (ϕ) satifies:
, which says that external JTB is closed under implication (if supported by a fixed reason r);
• ⊢ JTB e r (ϕ) → ϕ, which says that external JTB is veridical;
• ⊢ JTB e r (ϕ) → (r : ψ → ψ), which says that if an agent has an external JTB based on reason r, then r cannot support any false assertions (so-called "false lemmas"); and (ϕ) , which says that for provable ϕ, if the agent correctly believes that reason r is adequate, then she will have external JTB of ϕ based on r.
In contrast, one can show that JTB i r (ϕ) satisfies:
, which says that internal JTB is closed under implication (if supported by a fixed reason r);
• ⊢ JTB i r (ϕ) → ϕ, which says that internal JTB is veridical;
• JTB i r (ϕ) → (r : ψ → ψ), which says that if an agent has an internal JTB based on reason r, then r might support false assertions (so-called "false lemmas"); and
, which says that for provable ϕ, if the agent believes that reason r is adequate, then she will have internal JTB of ϕ based on r (even if her belief is mistaken).
The differences between JTB e r and JTB i r are in the last two properties. So we see that the main difference between external and internal JTB is in the reliability of the reason on which the JTB is based. External JTB requires that the reason cannot be faulty, whereas internal JTB merely requires that the agent believe (correctly or not) that the reason is non-faulty.
Using our quantified language, we adopt the following abbreviations: JTB e (ϕ) says that the agent has an external JTB for ϕ (based on some reason), and JTB i (ϕ) says the same but for internal JTB.
Is Knowledge JTB
e ? JTB i falls prey to Gettier's examples because the supporting reason need not be veridical (i.e., it admits "false lemmas"). JTB e , however, requires an adequate supporting reason, and hence this reason is necessarily veridical (i.e., it admits "no false lemmas"). This suggests we examine the equation
which defines knowledge as external JTB. What should we think of this equation? Consider the "fake barn county" situation [11] : the agent is in a county that has numerous fake barns that look exactly like real barns. Not knowing she is in this county, she sees what she thinks is a barn and concludes that it is indeed a barn. It turns out she is correct because, by chance, she happens to be looking at the only real barn in the entire county. Obviously, she has an internal JTB that she sees a barn, though most philosophers argue that she does not know she sees a barn. Our agent is in the situation:
That is, the claim that what the agent sees is a barn is supported by the reason r, which says that what she sees looks like a barn; the agent believes that r is adequate to guarantee the truth of what it supports; and the agent does actually see a barn. But is r in fact adequate? If we say it is, then we run into the following problem: had the agent picked a different barn-looking structure that turned out to be a fake, we would have
which implies that p is non-veridical, contradicting the assumed adequacy of r (since adequacy implies veridicality). This suggests to us that r is not necessarily adequate; that is, each of (Barn)∧r and (Barn)∧¬r is consistent with our intuitions about the "fake barn county" example. Conclusion: the agent need not have external JTB in this case. We take it that the "fake barn county" example seeks to challenge the agent's acumen in determining when it is safe to reason according to the principle 
which has the colloquial reading "what I see is what I get." 10 Since adequacy implies veridicality, one could use our notion of adequacy to indicate that the agent's use of (WSWG) is licensed. In particular, if we assume that (Barn) ∧ r, then we might construe this as a case in which the agent is in "normal barn county" (where there are no fake barns) and so her use of (WSWG) is licensed: r is an externally valid reason for the agent to infer that she sees a barn, so the agent knows that she sees a barn. In contrast, if we assume that (Barn) ∧ ¬r, then we might construe this as a case in which the agent is back in "fake barn county" and not licensed to draw the conclusion: r is not an externally valid reason for her to infer that she sees a barn, so she does not know that she sees a barn. Zagzebski's criticism of a JTB-based analysis of knowledge [18] might apply here: we either must sever the link between truth and justification (thereby going so far as to concede that there is knowledge in Gettier cases) or else assert that "there is no degree of independence at all between truth and justification" (in order to avoid Gettier problems). Zagzebski's position is that neither horn of her dilemma is satisfactory, and so the proper way to avoid the dilemma is to reject the possibility of analyzing knowledge in terms of JTB plus some extra component (i.e., reject the 9 Veridicality is defined in §2.1. Our framework can distinguish three "types" of reasons: those that are nonveridical (and hence inadequate), those that are veridical but inadequate, and those that are adequate (and hence veridical). Gettier's second case (G2) has reasons of the first type: non-veridical. The "fake barn county" case has reasons of the second type: veridical but inadequate. And one might argue that a "normal barn county" variant of "fake barn county" (in which there are no fake barns) has reasons of the third type: adequate. 10 This diagnosis was suggested to the third author by Alexandru Baltag (private communication).
"knowledge is JTB + x" approach all together); see also [17] . We accept that our approach is close to endorsing the second horn of Zagzebski's dilemma. However, by distinguishing adequacy from veridicality, we can still maintain a notion of independence between truth and justification. In particular, pace Zagzebski, our semantic analysis distinguishes between "adequate belief" (i.e., JTB e ) and "lucky true belief" (i.e., JTB i ).
No False Lemmas and The Problem of Mixed Reasons
So let us assume that our definition (KJTBe) of knowledge as external JTB is correct. Is it then possible to define knowledge (i.e., external JTB) in terms of internal JTB plus some other condition? Indeed it is: ⊢ JTB e (ϕ) ↔ (∃r)(r ∧ JTB i r (ϕ)) In words: to have external justification it is necessary and sufficient to have an adequate justification that serves as the basis for an internal JTB.
However, this analysis immediately raises a concern regarding the force of the quantifier on the right side of the equivalence. To appreciate the problem, it is worth reminding ourselves of one of the first responses to Gettier's examples: the so-called "no false lemmas" (hereafter "NFL") requirement (see [8] ). The NFL requirement is meant to rule out situations like Gettier's second case, wherein the agent starts from a mistaken belief that p to obtain a correct belief that p ∨ q. Thinking of the reasoning sequence of beliefs p, p ∨ q as a "proof," the initial "lemma" (i.e., assumption) p is false, but then a perfectly legitimate inference step to a logical consequence p ∨ q ends up on a formula that just so happens to be true.
In our framework, the obvious counterpart to the NFL requirement is the "no inadequate lemmas" (henceforth "NIL") requirement:
This says that every reason that supports an internal JTB of ϕ is adequate. Since adequate reasons support only true formulas (by axiom scheme (A)), the NIL requirement guarantees that no false "lemma" (i.e., formula) intrudes on a reason justifying a potential internal JTB of ϕ. This gives rise to the following notion of JTB with no inadequate lemmas:
This notion of JTB is logically stronger than external JTB: JTB e (ϕ) only requires that there be one adequate reason supporting an internal JTB of ϕ, whereas JTB+NIL requires adequacy of every reason supporting an internal JTB of ϕ. Thus ⊢ JTB+NIL(ϕ) → JTB e (ϕ) but not the other way around.
These considerations raise a potential worry for the JTB e analysis of knowledge: what happens when the agent rests her beliefs in a proposition (such as p ∨ q) on multiple sources? For example, 11 suppose our agent, who has excellent eyesight, sees someone in the distance but cannot quite make out who it is. Nevertheless, based on what she can see (represented by reason s), she correctly believes that the person in the distance is either Tweedle Dee or Tweedle Dum (represented respectively by p ∨ q). Further, she has another reason r to believe that the person is Tweedle Dee (i.e., p). For example, a friend might have told her that Tweedle Dum is on vacation in some faraway country. Now, unknown to our agent, the person in the distance is actually Tweedle Dum. Put formally:
That is, s supports the disjunction (that the person is Dee or Dum) but no disjunct, r supports the claim it is Dee, the agent believes s and r to be adequate, s is adequate (by hypothesis, because the agent's eyesight is excellent, and it could not possibly be someone other than Dee or Dum), and the person is actually not Dee but Dum. Now suppose we add to (TDTD) the assumption
that the agent believes no other reasons to be adequate. It can be shown that
In words: the agent has external JTB that p ∨ q (because the adequate reason s supports the disjunction); however, she does not have JTB with NIL of p ∨ q (because the inadequate reason r supports the disjunction). But is it a mistake to equate knowledge with JTB e instead of with JTB+NIL?
One reaction is to deny that there is knowledge when the universal condition is not satisfied. For an example supporting this reaction, suppose the agent proves that a certain Mersenne number m = 2 n − 1 is prime. Later, she bolsters her belief in the primality of m by coming to believe (incorrectly) that all Mersenne numbers are prime (i.e., all numbers of the form 2 k − 1 are prime, which is false). Can the agent still be said to know that m is prime? On one account, it seems not. Such situations of mixed reasons, where an agent has both adequate and inadequate reasons supporting the same proposition, arguably occur often in everyday life.
We are inclined to the opposite view: in a situation of mixed reasons, the agent can still have knowledge. Returning to the primality example, if the agent learns that not all Mersenne numbers are prime, then she will still believe that m is prime on the basis of her adequate "backup" reason (that she proved m is prime). So she could still be said to know that m is prime. 12 The Dee/Dum case is arguably similar: if the agent were to learn that r is unreliable, then she would still have an external JTB of the disjunction based on the "backup" reason s.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge to the claim that (KJTBe) is correct even in the case of mixed reasons comes when the quantity of inadequate reasons vastly exceeds the quantity of adequate reasons. For example, suppose our agent has an adequate reason s (based on an assertion in some recent official document) that one of the 20 members of the faculty of department D is a logician; further, suppose she has inadequate reasons r 1 , . . . , r 19 (based on a mistaken understanding of which specialties imply competence in logic) that the first 19 names listed on the department D faculty roster are logicians. We might be hard-pressed to say that our agent knows that department D has a logician on staff.
Perhaps this suggests that the agent in a case of mixed reasons can only be said to know the proposition if she also knows that her reasons are adequate. We resist this move, postponing further discussion on this point until the conclusion. Therefore, if we assume for the sake of argument that our agent values all reasons equally, then a tiny island of adequacy within an ocean of inadequacy is sufficient for the defender of mixed-reason knowledge. This might require granting that the agent's reasons are in some sense confused or that an agent who has only adequate reasons (and hence satisfies JTB+NFL) seems to "know better" than the agent with mixed reasons. But if one agent "knows better," it does not follow that the other does not know at all. Intuitions here may differ, so we prefer to leave a more detailed exploration of this problem for further work.
Let us return to the question raised at the beginning of this section: can we legitimately define knowledge as JTB e ? We have suggested an affirmative answer. But is JTB e too weak, especially when compared to JTB+NIL? Our answer is that JTB+NIL does indeed correspond to a more stringent concept of knowledge; perhaps we might call it "robust knowledge." Such an ideal might be more desirable to achieve, but this does not imply that the purely existential condition of JTB e is itself insufficient. But does JTB e provide us with a noncircular analysis of knowledge (as "JTB + x")? We have no conclusive argument for a positive answer, though in a bolder mood we might answer "maybe." We did not provide an analysis of the notion of adequacy itself, so one can still object that we have not ruled out the possibility of circularity. But we have also argued that the notion of "adequate reason" does not necessarily involve an explicit reference to epistemic concepts. Metaphysically, our notion of adequacy, which links reasons and propositions, may indeed be independent of epistemic concepts. If anything, our analysis at least asserts the existence of an essential connection between knowledge and justification, along with the existence of justifications that are intrinsically better than others.
Conclusion
Is knowledge the same thing as JTB? We wrote this paper based on a persistent feeling that both answers are defensible. 13 For the negative: Gettier's examples show that plausible reasons may be inadequate. For the positive: a JTB based on an adequate reason seems to rule out the possibility of Gettier cases and can arguably be construed as a form of knowledge.
We have shown that our framework is sufficient to address reason-based belief and that it can be applied to important notions in epistemology. However, we have neglected to provide a further analysis of "adequacy of a reason" into more primitive concepts. While this notion was used as a primitive in this paper, an in-depth study of this notion may be required in a full philosophical analysis of the concept of knowledge. Regardless, we think that our three-part hierarchy of reasons (non-veridical, veridical but inadequate, and adequate) is itself sufficiently fruitful to legitimate our approach.
A further and related difficulty on which we propose to end is the following: how does the agent know whether a reason is adequate? According to (KJTBe), the agent knows p if and only if there exists an adequate reason r that supports p and that the agent believes is adequate. Therefore, the agent knows r is adequate if and only if there exists an adequate reason s that supports r (i.e., s : r) and the agent believes that s is adequate. 14 Our framework therefore admits the possibility that the agent may know p based on an adequate reason r without knowing that r is itself adequate. In 13 This ambivalence is not idiosyncratic to us. Turri [15] mentions that Sellars agrees with the force of Gettier's examples but still thinks that knowledge is JTB.
14 Note that we may have s = r. In particular, it is consistent with our theory for reasons to be self-supporting (i.e., r : r). It is also consistent with our theory for reasons to be non-self-supporting (i.e., ¬(r : r)). Since our theory permits either option, it is up to the user of our theory to choose which way to go as per her preference. We also note that it is consistent for r to be self-rejecting (i.e., r : ¬r), and it is consistent for r to be non-self-rejecting (i.e., ¬(r : ¬r)). this, our framework supports the main contention of an externalist account of knowledge: one may know p without knowing that one knows p (see [17] ). 15 We think this is right for the externalist, though we emphasize that our theory is in principle neutral regarding the existence of reasons justifying the adequacy of other reasons. We leave a more ample discussion of this issue for another occasion.
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A Technical Results

A.1 Semantics for RBB
The models of RBB are structures M = (W, [·] , N, V ) having:
• a nonempty set W of "possible worlds,"
on the set of possible worlds,
• a "neighborhood function" N : W → ℘(℘(W )) mapping each world w to a collection N (w) of sets of worlds ("propositions") that the agent believes at w,
• a propositional valuation V : W → ℘(P ) mapping each world w to the set V (w) of propositional letters that are true at w.
To indicate that the components W , [·] , N , and V come from model M , we may write W M , [·] M , N M , and V M (respectively). For each world w ∈ W and reason r ∈ R, we let r(w) denote the set
of all worlds that are r-accessible from w (i.e., accessible according to the relation [r]). We also let r • denote the set r
of all worlds that are r-accessible from themselves. These are the worlds at which the reason r is said to be reflexive. As we will see shortly, a reason that is reflexive at a world will be adequate at that world. So reflexivity and adequacy are equivalent notions, and hence we may conflate the two, which ought not cause confusion. To indicate the sets r(w) and r • arise from worlds in model M , we may write r M (w) and r M • (respectively). We require our models to satisfy three key properties:
(pr) For each x ∈ P ∩ R, we have x ∈ V (w) if and only if w ∈ x(w).
This says that for propositional letters that are also reasons, the truth assignment given to x by the valuation V agrees with the reflexivity of x. This ensures that there is no ambiguity in the assignment of truth to propositional letters that are also reasons. 16
This says that if the agent believes X at world w, then she does not believe the complement W − X at world w.
(rb) r(w) ⊆ X and r • ∈ N (w) together imply that X ∈ N (w).
This says that if r is a reason to believe X at world w and the agent believes at w that r is reflexive (i.e., an adequate reason), then the agent believes X at world w. (rc) r • ∈ N (w) and s • ∈ N (w) together imply that r(w) ∩ s(w) = ∅, which says that if the agent believes reasons r and s are both reflexive, then these two reasons are consistent.
In essence, since (d) requires belief consistency and (rb) says that the agent believes everything supported by a reason she believes to be adequate, it follows that she will not believe contradictory reasons to be adequate. (rc) is the model-theoretic analog of the principle (RC) of reason consistency.
A pointed model is a pair (M, w) consisting of a model M and a world w in M . We write M, w |= ϕ to say that ϕ is true at the pointed model (M, w), and we write M, w |= ϕ for the negation. We define the satisfaction relation |= and the set
of worlds in the model M at which the formula χ is satisfied as follows.
• M, w |= p means that p ∈ V (w).
• M, w |= ¬ϕ means that M, w |= ϕ.
• M, w |= ϕ ∨ ψ means that M, w |= ϕ or M, w |= ψ.
• M, w |= r : ϕ means that r(w) ⊆ ϕ M .
• M, w |= r means that w ∈ r(w).
• M, w |= Bϕ means that ϕ M ∈ N (w).
We note that |= is well-defined: for each x ∈ P ∩ R, we have x ∈ V (w) if and only w ∈ x(w) by (pr), and therefore M, w |= x is well-defined. To say that ϕ is valid in M , written M |= ϕ, means that ϕ M = W . To say that ϕ is valid, written |= ϕ, means that M |= ϕ for every model M . It is shown in Theorem A.1 that RBB is sound and complete for this semantics: we have ⊢ ϕ if and only if |= ϕ.
The following terminology is the semantic analog of terminology presented at the end of §2.1: given a reason r and a pointed model (M, w) representing the key features of a particular situation of reason-based belief, to say
• "r is adequate at (M, w)" means M, w |= r;
• "r is veridical for ϕ at (M, w)" means M, w |= r : ϕ → ϕ; and
• "r is veridical at (M, w)" means M, w |= r : ϕ → ϕ for each formula ϕ.
In using the above terminology, we may omit mention of (M, w) if it should be clear from context which pointed model is meant. It follows by (rb) that every adequate reason is veridical; however, for the same reasons as we have seen in the syntactic case, a veridical reason is not necessarily adequate.
In the semantic context, an alternative notion of veridicality might be of interest: to say "r is semantically veridical for X at (M, w)," where X ⊆ W M is a proposition (i.e., set of worlds), means r M (w) ⊆ X implies w ∈ X; and to say "r is semantically veridical at (M, w)" means r is semantically veridical for each X ⊆ W M . This notion of "semantic veridicality" is more general than the notion of "syntactic veridicality" presented in the previous paragraph and at the end of §2.1. Nevertheless, our primary interest is in syntactic veridicality, and so any mention of "veridicality" should be assumed to refer to syntactic veridicality.
A.2 Semantics for RBB σ and RBB
+ σ
The models for RBB can be construed as models for RBB σ if we require the following additional properties:
(ma) w ∈ σ(w) and r • ∈ N (w) together imply that w ∈ r(w).
which says that if σ is reflexive, then each reason r believed to be reflexive is in fact reflexive;
which says that the agent believes σ is reflexive; and (mr) r(w) ⊆ X and r • ∈ N (w) together imply that σ(w) ⊆ X, which says that σ supports X if r supports X and the agent believes r is reflexive.
We write the satisfaction relation |= σ to indicate that we restrict to models satisfying (ma), (mb), and (mr). By Theorem A.2, RBB σ is sound and complete for the class of models satisfying (ma), (mb), and (mr). Models for the theory RBB + σ must satisfy (ma), (mb), (mr), and the following property:
(mt) X ∈ N (w) implies σ(w) ⊆ X, which says that σ supports X if the agent believes X.
We write |= + σ to indicate that we restrict to models satisfying (ma), (mb), (mr), and (mt). By Theorem A.2, RBB + σ is sound and complete for the class of models satisfying (ma), (mb), (mr), and (mt).
Generally, we shall work in the theory RBB and therefore none of principles (MA), (MB), (MR), or (MT) (or their corresponding lowercase-named semantic principles) are to be assumed in what follows, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
A.3 Semantics for QRBB, QRBB σ , and QRBB
The models for RBB can be used as models for QRBB as well. All that we must do is add the following satisfaction principles:
• M, w |= r = s means that r = s.
• M, w |= (∀r)ϕ means that M, w |= ϕ[s/r] for each s free for r in ϕ.
It is shown in Theorem A.5 that QRBB is sound and complete for this semantics: for each theory we have QRBB ⊢ ϕ if and only if |= ϕ. However, there is one caveat: our proof of the completeness result requires that the set R of reasons be at least countably infinite.
Additional semantic restrictions must be imposed to ensure that QRBB models also work for QRBB σ or for QRBB + σ ; see §A.2 for details. Soundness and completeness for QRBB σ and for QRBB + σ follows by Theorem A.12, with the same caveat for completeness as for QRBB.
A.4 RBB Soundness and Completeness
We now prove the following theorem. 
Soundness is by induction on the length of derivation. The arguments for (CL), (MP), (RK), (D), (RN), and (E) are straighforward. We consider the remaining cases.
• Validity of (A): |= r : ϕ → (r → ϕ).
M, w |= r : ϕ and M, w |= r together imply that r(w) ⊆ ϕ M and w ∈ r(w). But then M, w |= ϕ.
• Validity of (RB): |= r : ϕ → (Br → Bϕ).
M, w |= r : ϕ and M, w |= Br together imply that r(w) ⊆ ϕ M and r • ∈ N (w). But then ϕ M ∈ N (w) by (rb) and hence M, w |= Bϕ.
So RBB is sound.
For completeness, we prove that RBB θ implies there exists a pointed model (
We use a canonical model construction to build the model M c = (W, [·] , N, V ) as follows. First, to say that a set S of formulas is consistent means that for no finite S ′ ⊆ S do we have RBB ⊢ ( S ′ ) → ⊥, where ⊥ is a fixed contradiction such as p ∧ ¬p. To say a set of formulas is maximal consistent means that it is consistent and adding any formula not already present will result in a set that is inconsistent (i.e., not consistent). Let M bet the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas. By a standard Lindenbaum construction, it follows that {¬θ} can be extended to some Γ θ ∈ M and therefore M is not empty. We define W := M × {1, 2} and will write (Γ, i) ∈ W in the abbreviated form Γ i . Since M is nonempty, W is nonempty. For each reason r ∈ R and Γ ∈ M , define the set Γ r := {ϕ ∈ F | r : ϕ ∈ Γ} of r-supported formulas in Γ. We then define [r] by setting
This way, a world ∆ j is r-accessible from Γ i iff ∆ j contains all formulas ϕ that are r-supported at Γ i (as per membership of r : ϕ in Γ), unless of course ∆ j = Γ i and reflexivity is forbidden by ¬r ∈ Γ. For each formula ϕ ∈ F , define
to be the set of worlds defined by the formula ϕ. Then let
be the set of worlds not definable by any formula. For each Γ i ∈ W , we define
Intuitively, this is the set of non-formula-definable neighborhoods X for which the agent believes there is a reason that supports X. The neighborhood function N is then defined by
Therefore, an agent believes a neighborhood X iff the agent believes some formula ϕ that defines X or, if X is non-formula-definable, the agent believes there is a reason supporting X. Finally, we define the valuation by
This defines M c . We prove the following Consistency Lemma: for each r ∈ R and Γ i ∈ W , if Br ∈ Γ, then Γ r is consistent. Proceeding, assume Br ∈ Γ and hence that ¬B¬r ∈ Γ by (D) and maximal consistency. Toward a contradiction, suppose Γ r is not consistent. Then there exists a finite S ⊆ Γ r such that ⊢ ( S) → ⊥. Hence ⊢ ( χ∈S r : χ) → r : ⊥ by modal reasoning. Applying maximal consistency and the fact that S ⊆ Γ r , we obtain r : ⊥ ∈ Γ. By maximal consistency and the fact that ⊢ r : ⊥ → r : ϕ for any ϕ, we obtain r : ¬r ∈ Γ. Since Br ∈ Γ, it follows from r : ¬r ∈ Γ by (RB) and maximal consistency that B¬r ∈ Γ. Since ¬B¬r ∈ Γ, it follows that Γ is not consistent, a contradiction. Conclusion: Γ r is consistent.
We now prove that M c satisfies the properties (pr), (d), and (rb).
• M c satisfies (pr): if x ∈ P ∩ R, then x ∈ V (Γ i ) if and only if Γ i ∈ x(Γ i ).
So assume x ∈ V (Γ i ). This means x ∈ Γ. But then we have ¬x / ∈ Γ by the consistency of Γ. Further, since x ∈ Γ, it follows by (A) and the maximal consistency of Γ that Γ x ⊆ Γ. But ¬x / ∈ Γ and Γ x ⊆ Γ together imply Γ i ∈ x(Γ i ), which completes the argument for this direction. For the converse direction, if Γ i ∈ x(Γ i ), then it follows by the definition of x(Γ i ) that ¬x / ∈ Γ. So x ∈ Γ by the maximal consistency of Γ. But then we have x ∈ V (Γ i ) by the definition of V .
There are two cases to consider.
First case for (d): assume X ∈ N (Γ i ) − N + (Γ i ). It follows that there exists Bϕ ∈ Γ such that X = W (ϕ). By (D) and the maximal consistency of Γ, we have ¬B¬ϕ ∈ Γ. Toward a contradiction, assume X ′ ∈ N (Γ i ). Since X = W (ϕ), we have X ′ = W (¬ϕ) by maximal consistency and therefore that X ′ / ∈ N + . Hence X ′ ∈ N (Γ i ) − N + (Γ i ), which means there exists Bψ ∈ Γ such that X ′ = W (ψ). It follows that ⊢ ψ ↔ ¬ϕ, since otherwise {ψ, ϕ} could be extended to some ∆ ∈ M satisfying ∆ j ∈ W (ψ) = X ′ and ∆ j ∈ W (ϕ) = X or {¬ψ, ¬ϕ} could be extended to some Ω ∈ M satisfying Ω k ∈ W −W (ψ) = X and Ω k ∈ W −W (ϕ) = X ′ , but both situations are impossible because X ′ ∩ X = ∅. Hence ⊢ ψ ↔ ¬ϕ. Applying (E), we obtain ⊢ Bψ ↔ B¬ϕ and therefore that B¬ϕ ∈ Γ, contradicting the consistency of Γ. Conclusion:
Second case for (d): assume X ∈ N + (Γ i ). This means there exists Br ∈ Γ such that r(Γ i ) ⊆ X. Since X ∈ N + , it follows that X ′ ∈ N + as well. So, toward a contradiction, assume
If Γ r ∪ Γ r ′ were consistent, then we could extend this set to some ∆ ∈ M . Taking j = i, it would follow that Γ r ⊆ ∆ and Γ r ′ ⊆ ∆ and that ∆ j = Γ i . Hence we would have that
Applying the Consistency Lemma and the fact that Br ∈ Γ and Br ′ ∈ Γ, each of Γ r and Γ r ′ is consistent, so it follows from the inconsistency of Γ r ∪ Γ r ′ that there exists a finite S ⊆ Γ r and some ϕ ∈ Γ r ′ such that ⊢ ( S) → ¬ϕ. But then we have ⊢ ( χ∈S r : χ) → r : ¬ϕ by modal reasoning. Since S ⊆ Γ r , it follows by maximal consistency that r : ¬ϕ ∈ Γ. Applying our assumption Br ∈ Γ, it follows by (RB) and maximal consistency that B¬ϕ ∈ Γ. But ϕ ∈ Γ r ′ and hence r ′ : ϕ ∈ Γ. Since Br ′ ∈ Γ, it follows by (RB) and maximal consistency that Bϕ ∈ Γ and therefore that ¬B¬ϕ ∈ Γ by (D) and maximal consistency. But then we have shown that Γ is inconsistent, a contradiction. Conclusion:
• M c satisfies (rb): if r(Γ i ) ⊆ X and r • ∈ N (Γ i ), then X ∈ N (Γ i ).
Assume r(Γ i ) ⊆ X and r • ∈ N (Γ i ). First, it follows by an easy argument that r • = W (r). Therefore r • / ∈ N + . So from r • ∈ N (Γ i ), it follows that there exists Bϕ ∈ Γ such that r • = W (ϕ). Since r • = W (r), it follows that ⊢ ϕ ↔ r. Applying (E), ⊢ Bϕ ↔ Br. By the maximal consistency of Γ, we have Br ∈ Γ. If X ∈ N + , then since we have shown that Br ∈ Γ and since we assumed that r(Γ i ) ⊆ X, it follows that X ∈ N + (Γ i ) ⊆ N (Γ i ). So assume X / ∈ N + , which implies there exists ψ such that X = W (ψ). From r(Γ i ) ⊆ X = W (ψ) and j = i, it follows that for each ∆ j ∈ W satisfying Γ r ⊆ ∆, we have ψ ∈ ∆. If Γ r ∪ {¬ψ} were consistent, then we could extend this set to Ω ∈ M such that Γ r ⊆ Ω, j = i, Ω j ∈ W , and ψ / ∈ Ω, a contradiction. So from the inconsistency of Γ r ∪ {¬ψ}, the fact that Br ∈ Γ, and the consistency of Γ r (by way of the Consistency Lemma), it follows that there exists a finite S ⊆ Γ r such that ⊢ ( S) → ψ and hence ⊢ ( χ∈S r : χ) → r : ψ by modal reasoning. Since S ⊆ Γ r , it follows by maximal consistency that r : ψ ∈ Γ. But since Br ∈ Γ, it follows by (RB) and maximal consistency that Bψ ∈ Γ and hence W (ψ) = X ∈ N (Γ i ).
To complete the argument, it suffices to prove the Truth Lemma: for each formula ϕ ∈ F and world Γ i ∈ W , we have ϕ ∈ Γ iff M c , Γ i |= ϕ. The proof is by induction on the construction of formulas, and the arguments for the base and Boolean inductive step cases are standard, so we only consider the remaining non-Boolean inductive step cases.
• Inductive step: r ∈ Γ iff M c , Γ i |= r. If r ∈ Γ, then it follows by (A) and maximal consistency that Γ r ⊆ Γ and therefore that Γ i ∈ r(Γ i ). But this is what it means to have M c , Γ i |= r.
Conversely, if M c , Γ i |= r, then we have Γ i ∈ r(Γ i ). By the definition of N (Γ i ), we have ¬r / ∈ Γ and therefore r ∈ Γ by maximal consistency.
• Inductive step: r : ϕ ∈ Γ iff M c , Γ i |= r : ϕ.
If r : ϕ ∈ Γ, then we have r(Γ i ) ⊆ W (ϕ). By the induction hypothesis, r(Γ i ) ⊆ ϕ Mc . But this is what it means to have M c , w |= r : ϕ.
Conversely, if M c , w |= r : ϕ, then we have r(Γ i ) ⊆ ϕ Mc and hence r(Γ i ) ⊆ W (ϕ) by the induction hypothesis. Toward a contradiction, assume ¬r : ϕ ∈ Γ. It follows that Γ r ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent, for otherwise there would exist a finite S ⊆ Γ r such that ⊢ ( S) → ϕ, hence ⊢ ( χ∈S r : χ) → r : ϕ by modal reasoning, and therefore r : ϕ ∈ Γ, which is impossible because it would follow by the assumption ¬r : ϕ ∈ Γ that Γ is inconsistent. So we may extend the consistent set Γ r ∪ {¬ϕ} to some ∆ ∈ M . Taking j = i, it follows that ∆ j / ∈ W (ϕ) and ∆ j ∈ r(Γ i ), which contradicts r(Γ i ) ⊆ W (ϕ). So our assumption that ¬r : ϕ ∈ Γ is incorrect; what we actually have is that ¬r : ϕ / ∈ Γ and therefore that r : ϕ ∈ Γ by maximal consistency.
• Inductive step: Conversely, if M c , w |= Bϕ, then we have ϕ Mc ∈ N (Γ i ) and therefore that W (ϕ) ∈ N (Γ i ) by the induction hypothesis. Since W (ϕ) / ∈ N + , it follows that there exists Bψ ∈ Γ such that W (ψ) = W (ϕ). From this we have that ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ, for otherwise {ψ, ¬ϕ} could be extended to ∆ ∈ M satisfying ∆ i ∈ W (ψ) − W (ϕ) or {¬ψ, ϕ} could be extended to Ω ∈ M satisfying Ω i ∈ W (ϕ) − W (ψ), but both contradict W (ϕ) = W (ψ). Applying (E), we have ⊢ Bϕ ↔ Bϕ and therefore it follows by maximal consistency that Bϕ ∈ Γ.
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma. By this lemma and the fact that ¬θ ∈ Γ θ , we have M c , Γ θ 1 |= θ. Completeness follows.
A.5 RBB σ and RBB
+ σ Soundness and Completeness
Recalling the semantics for RBB σ and for RBB + σ from §A.2, we prove the following theorem. 
Soundness for RBB σ and for RBB + σ are as for RBB (Theorem A.1) except that we must check soundness of the additional axioms. We consider each in turn.
• Validity of (MA): |= σ σ → (Br → r) and |= + σ σ → (Br → r). Assume M, w |= σ σ and M, w |= σ Br. This means w ∈ σ(w) and r • ∈ N (w), from which it follows by (ma) that w ∈ r(w). But then M, w |= σ r. The argument for the satisfaction operator |= + σ is the same.
• Validity of (MB): |= σ Bσ and |= + σ Bσ. Given (M, w), we have σ • ∈ N (w) by (mb). So M, w |= σ Bσ and M, w |= + σ Bσ.
• Validity of (MR): |= σ r : ϕ → (Br → σ : ϕ) and |= + σ r : ϕ → (Br → σ : ϕ). Assume M, w |= σ r : ϕ and M, w |= σ Br. Then r(w) ⊆ ϕ M and r • ∈ N (w). Applying (mr), it follows that σ(w) ⊆ ϕ M . But then M, w |= σ σ : ϕ. The argument for the satisfaction operator |= + σ is the same. • M c satisfies (ma) for RBB σ and for RBB
Assume Γ i ∈ σ(Γ i ) and r • ∈ N (w). As in the proof that M c satisfies (rb) from Theorem A.1, it follows from r • ∈ N (Γ i ) that Br ∈ Γ. Applying the definition of σ(Γ i ) to our assumption Γ i ∈ σ(Γ i ), it follows that ¬σ / ∈ Γ and therefore σ ∈ Γ by maximal consistency. Since σ ∈ Γ and Br ∈ Γ, we have by (MA) and maximal consistency that r ∈ Γ. But then Γ r ⊆ Γ by (A) and maximal consistency. Since it follows from r ∈ Γ by maximal consistency that ¬r / ∈ Γ and we have shown that Γ r ⊆ Γ, it follows by the definition of r(Γ i ) that Γ i ∈ r(Γ i ).
• M c satisfies (mb) for RBB σ and for RBB
• M c satisfies (mr) for RBB σ and for RBB
Assume r(Γ i ) ⊆ X and r • ∈ N (Γ i ). As in the proof that M c satisfies (rb) from Theorem A.1, it follows from r • ∈ N (Γ i ) that Br ∈ Γ. Applying (MR), classical reasoning, and maximal consistency, we have r : ϕ → σ : ϕ for each formula ϕ in the language. So if for some ∆ ∈ M we have Γ σ ⊆ ∆ and ϕ ∈ Γ r , then r : ϕ ∈ Γ by the definition of Γ r , hence σ : ϕ ∈ Γ by maximal consistency and the fact that r : ϕ → σ : ϕ ∈ Γ, hence ϕ ∈ Γ σ by the defintion of Γ σ , and therefore ϕ ∈ ∆ by the assumption Γ σ ⊆ ∆. That is, given ∆ ∈ M , we have Γ σ ⊆ ∆ implies Γ r ⊆ ∆. So if we are given ∆ j ∈ σ(Γ i ), then we have Γ σ ⊆ ∆ and therefore that Γ r ⊆ ∆. Now if ∆ j = Γ i , then we have ∆ j ∈ r(Γ i ) by the definition of r(Γ i ). And if ∆ j = Γ i and therefore ¬σ / ∈ Γ by the definition of σ(Γ i ), it follows by maximal consistency that σ ∈ Γ; hence r ∈ Γ by Br ∈ Γ, (MA), and maximal consistency; hence ¬r / ∈ Γ by maximal consistency; and therefore we still have ∆ j ∈ r(Γ i ) by the definition of r(Γ i ). So we have shown that σ(Γ i ) ⊆ r(Γ i ). Since r(Γ i ) ⊆ X, it follows that σ(Γ i ) ⊆ X.
• M c satisfies (mt) for RBB
Assume X ∈ N (Γ i ). There are two cases to consider. First case: if X ∈ N + (Γ i ), then there exists Br ∈ Γ such that r(Γ i ) ⊆ X. But we proved in the above argument for (mr) that Br ∈ Γ and r(Γ i ) ⊆ X together imply that σ(
Then there exists Bϕ ∈ Γ such that W (ϕ) = X. By (MT) and maximal consistency, σ : ϕ ∈ Γ. Hence σ(Γ i ) ⊆ W (ϕ) = X.
A.7 QRBB Soundness and Completeness
Recalling the semantics for QRBB from §A.3, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem A.5 (QRBB Soundness and Completeness). We have:
• QRBB is sound: QRBB ⊢ ϕ implies |= ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F ∀ ; and
• if R is at least countably infinite, then QRBB is sound and complete: for each ϕ ∈ F ∀ ,
Soundness is by induction on the length of derivation. Most cases are addressed in the proof of Theorem A.1. We only address the remaining cases.
• Validity of (UD): |= (∀r)(ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → (∀r)ψ), where r is not free in ϕ.
Assume M, w |= (∀r)(ϕ → ψ) and M, w |= ϕ. From the former, we have M, w |= (ϕ → ψ)[s/r] for each s free for r in ϕ → ψ. Since r is not free in ϕ, it follows that M, w |= ϕ → ψ[s/r] for each s free for r in ψ. By our assumption M, w |= ϕ, it follows that M, w |= ψ[s/r] for each s free for r in ψ. That is, M, w |= (∀r)ψ.
• Validity of (UI): |= (∀r)ϕ → ϕ[s/r], where s is free for r in ϕ.
By the definition of satisfaction.
• Validity of (EP) and (EN): |= r = r and |= ¬(r = s), where r and s are different.
• (Gen) preserves validity: |= ϕ implies |= (∀r)ϕ. So QRBB is sound. For completeness, we adapt the standard Henkin-style construction in [16, §3.1] to the present setting. To begin, our language F ∀ depends on two parameters: a nonempty set R of reasons and a nonempty set P of propositional letters. We shall keep P fixed but consider different options for R.
As such, it will be convenient to write L(R) to denote the set of formulas with quantifiers that we can form using R = ∅ as our set of reasons. By convention in this proof, we restrict all derivation to be with respect to QRBB. Also, we shall assume for the remainder of the argument that R is at least countably infinite.
To say that a set Γ ⊆ L(R) is consistent means that for no finite Γ ′ ⊆ Γ is it the case that ⊢ ( Γ ′ ) → ⊥. To say that Γ ⊆ L(R) is maximal L(R)-consistent means that Γ is consistent and adding to Γ any formula of L(R) not already present would produce an inconsistent set.
For the purposes of the present proof, a theory in the language L(R) is a set T ⊆ L(R) of formulas in L(R) satisfying the following properties:
• Closure under theorems: if ϕ ∈ L(R) and ⊢ ϕ, then ϕ ∈ T ; and
Given Γ ⊆ L(R), let T R (Γ) be the set of all theories in L(R) that contain Γ. The intersection of a collection of theories in L(R) is also a theory in L(R). Hence for each Γ ⊆ L(R), we may define the theory
called the theory in L(R) generated by Γ. An L(R)-proof from Γ is a finite nonempty sequence ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n of formulas in L(R) such that for each ϕ i in the sequence, we have one of the following: ϕ i ∈ Γ, QRBB ⊢ ϕ i , or there exist ϕ j and ϕ k from earlier in the sequence (i.e., j < i and k < i) such that ϕ i follows by (MP) from ϕ j and ϕ k (i.e., ϕ k = ϕ j → ϕ i ). To say that an L(R)-proof from Γ is of ϕ, means that ϕ is the last formula in the sequence. We write Γ ⊢ R ϕ to mean that there exists an L(R)-proof of ϕ from Γ. Notation: in writing the set to the left of the turnstile ⊢ R , we may use a comma to denote set-theoretic union, we may identify an individual formula with the singleton set containing the formula in question, and we may omit any set-indicating notation if the set is empty. We state without proof the following results, grouped together under the name Simple Lemma:
• if Γ is finite, then Γ ′ ⊢ R ϕ iff Γ ′ ⊢ R ϕ, where Γ ′ := χ∈Γ ′ χ; and
Generally the Simple Lemma will be used only tacitly.
Given a theory T in L(R) and a theory T ′ in L(R ′ ), to say that T ′ is an extension of T means that T ⊆ T ′ . To say that T ′ is a conservative extension of T means that T ′ ∩ L(R) = T .
To say that a theory T in L(R) is Henkin means that for each closed formula (i.e., containing no free variables) of the form ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈ L(R), there exists a reason r ϕ ∈ R called a witness (or Henkin constant) for ¬(∀r)ϕ for which we have
Given a theory T in L(R), let R * be the set obtained from R by adding for each closed ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈ L(R) a new reason r ϕ . To be clear: there is a bijection between the set of closed formulas ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈ L(R) and the set R * − R. We define the set
of Henkin axioms in L(R) and let T * := T R * (T ∪ H(R)) be the theory in L(R * ) generated by T ∪ H(R).
Lemma A.6 (Constants). Assume R is at least countably infinite and
Proof. The right-to-left direction is immediate (since R ⊆ R ′ ), so we prove only the left-to-right direction. Proceeding, assume Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L(R) and Γ ⊢ R ′ ϕ; that is, there exists an
. . , r ′ m be a non-repeating list of all reasons in R ′ − R that appear in π ′ . Since R is at least countably infinite and π ′ is finite, we may choose a non-repeating list r 1 , . . . , r m of reasons in R that do not appear anywhere in π ′ . Such a list exists because R is at least countably infinite. Form π := ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n by defining ψ i as the formula obtained from ψ ′ i by replacing all occurrences of r ′ 1 , . . . , r ′ m by r 1 , . . . , r m (respectively).
Lemma A.7 (Deduction). For each R, we have:
Proof. The right-to-left direction is easy, so we only address the left-to-right direction. Proceeding, assume Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ R ψ, which implies there exists an L(R)-proof χ 1 , . . . , χ n of ψ from Γ ∪ {ϕ}. It suffices for us to prove by induction on i ≤ n that Γ ⊢ R ϕ → χ i .
In the base case, i = 1 and therefore either ⊢ χ i or χ i ∈ Γ ∪ {ϕ}. If ⊢ χ i , then Γ ⊢ R χ i . If χ i ∈ Γ ∪ {ϕ}, then either χ i ∈ Γ or χ i = ϕ. If χ i = ϕ, then since ⊢ ϕ → ϕ by (CL), we have Γ ⊢ R ϕ → ϕ. So suppose χ i ∈ Γ. Hence Γ ⊢ R χ i . Since for ǫ i := χ i → (ϕ → χ i ) we have ⊢ ǫ i by (CL), we have Γ ⊢ R ǫ i and therefore Γ ⊢ R ϕ → χ i .
For the induction step (i > 1), we have that ⊢ χ i , that χ i ∈ Γ ∪ {ϕ}, or that χ i follows by (MP) from χ k and χ k → χ i appearing earlier in the L(R)-proof. The argument for the first two possibilities is as in the base case. So assume the third possibility obtains. By the induction hypothesis, we have Γ ⊢ R ϕ → χ k and Γ ⊢ R ϕ → (χ k → χ i ) Let θ i be the classical tautology
We have ⊢ θ i by (CL) and hence Γ ⊢ R θ i . But then Γ ⊢ R ϕ → χ i by (MP).
We remark that the version of Lemma A.7 for the QRBB consequence relation ⊢ does not hold in general. For example, we have r : ϕ ⊢ (∀r)(r : ϕ) and yet r : ϕ → (∀r)(r : ϕ). As another example, we have p ⊢ r : p and yet p → r : p. Lemma A.7 does not fail in similar ways because the consequence relation given by the R-specific turnstile ⊢ R gives rise to a notion of proof (i.e., the L(R)-proof) that forbids the direct use of any QRBB rule other than (MP). Therefore T, H ′ ⊢ R * ϕ. Applying the induction hypothesis, T ⊢ R ϕ. Now, given a theory T in L(R), define:
Lemma A.10 (Henkin). Let R be at least countably infinite and T be a theory in L(R). Then T ω is a Henkin theory that is a conservative extension of T .
Proof. Take a closed ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈ L(R ω ). Then there exists i ∈ ω such that ¬(∀r)ϕ ∈ L(R i ). But then there is a witness r ϕ ∈ L(R i+1 ) ⊆ L(R ω ) such that
So T ω is a Henkin theory. By induction on i ∈ ω, we prove that T i is a conservative extension of T . Base case: T 0 = T and the result is immediate. Induction step: T i+1 is a conservative extension of T i by Lemma A.9; that is, T i+1 ∩ L(R i ) = T i . By the induction hypothesis,
So each T i is a conservative extension of T . But then
which shows that T ω is a conservative extension of T .
By the usual Lindenbaum argument (using Zorn's Lemma) [16, §3.1], for each R, any consistent set in L(R) may be extended to a maximal L(R)-consistent set. Hence for a consistent theory T in L(R), the theory T ω in L(R ω ) is consistent and may be extended to a maximal L(R ω )-consistent set T ′ ω . This set is a theory in L(R ω ). Further, this theory is Henkin because T ω ⊆ T ′ ω , both theories are in the same language, T ω is Henkin by Lemma A.10, and any extension of a Henkin theory within the same language is still Henkin (because all Henkin axioms are already present).
To prove completeness of QRBB, we take θ such that QRBB θ. We construct a structure M c = (W, [·] , N, V ) as in the proof of Theorem A.1 except that our set of worlds W is defined differently. First, let M 0 be the set of all maximal L(R)-consistent sets; each such set is a theory in L(R). For each theory T ∈ M 0 , define M ω (T ) to be the set of all maximal L(R ω )-consistent extensions of T ω . As we have seen, each member of M ω (T ) is a maximal L(R ω )-consistent Henkin theory that is conservative over T (Lemma A.10). Define the set
whose members are maximal L(R ω )-consistent extensions of T ω for some T ∈ M 0 . It follows that {¬θ} can be extended to a T θ ∈ M 0 and hence neither M ω (T θ ) nor M is empty. We define W := M × {1, 2} and write (Γ, i) ∈ W in the abbreviated form Γ i . Since M is nonempty, W is nonempty. The remaining components of M c are defined as in the proof of Theorem A.1 except that all language-specific aspects of definitions are extended to the larger language L(R ω ).
The proof that M c satisfies (pr), (d), and (rb) is as in the proof of Theorem A.1. So all that remains is to prove the Truth Lemma: for each formula ϕ ∈ L(R ω ) and world Γ i ∈ W , we have ϕ ∈ Γ iff M c , Γ i |= ϕ. The proof is by induction on the construction of formulas. The arguments for all but two cases are as in the proof of Theorem A.1. All that remains are the equality and quantifier inductive step cases.
• Inductive step: (s = r) ∈ Γ iff M c , Γ i |= s = r.
By (EP) and (EN), we have (s = r) ∈ Γ iff s = r. But the latter holds iff M c , Γ i |= s = r.
• Inductive step: (∀r)ϕ ∈ Γ iff M c , Γ i |= (∀r)ϕ.
If (∀r)ϕ ∈ Γ, then it follows by maximal L(R ω )-consistency and (UI) that ϕ[s/r] ∈ Γ for each s ∈ R ω that is free for r in ϕ. This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma. To complete the proof of completeness, we recall that we obtained T θ ∈ M 0 as a maximal L(R)-consistent extension of {¬θ}. Hence there exists Γ θ ∈ M ω (T θ ) ⊆ M . But Γ θ is a maximal L(R ω )-consistent extension of (T θ ) ω , and (T θ ) ω is a conservative extension of T θ by Lemma A.10. Therefore, since θ / ∈ T θ by consistency, we have θ / ∈ Γ θ . Applying the Truth Lemma, M c , Γ θ 1 |= θ. Completeness follows.
A.8 Conservativity of QRBB Over RBB As a corollary of Theorems A.1 and A.5, we have the following.
Corollary A.11. QRBB is a conservative extension of RBB: for each ϕ ∈ F , QRBB ⊢ ϕ iff RBB ⊢ ϕ .
Proof. The right-to-left direction is obvious (QRBB contains all the axioms and rules of RBB). The left-to-right direction follows by QRBB soundness (Theorem A.5) and RBB completeness (Theorem A.1).
A.9 QRBB σ and QRBB
+ σ Soundness and Completeness
Recalling the semantics for QRBB σ and for QRBB + σ from §A.3, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem A.12 (QRBB σ and QRBB + σ Soundness and Completeness). Assume R contains the symbol σ.
• QRBB σ is sound: QRBB σ ⊢ ϕ implies |= σ ϕ for each ϕ ∈ F ∀ .
• if R is at least countably infinite, then QRBB σ is sound and complete: for each ϕ ∈ F ∀ , QRBB σ ⊢ ϕ iff |= σ ϕ .
• analogous soundness and completeness results hold for QRBB + σ with respect to the satisfaction relation |= + σ .
Soundness is proved as in Theorem A.2. Completeness is proved as in Theorem A.5, except that provability is taken with respect to either QRBB σ or QRBB + σ and one must show (using an argument as in the completness portion of Theorem A.2) that M c satisfies the relevant properties.
